Revealed: After the Pahalgam massacre, a once-classified CIA report exposes Pakistan’s fear of India

On April 22, 2025, a horrific terrorist attack unfolded in the Baisaran Valley near Pahalgam, a popular tourist destination in Jammu and Kashmir.

Gunmen allegedly linked to The Resistance Front (TRF) launched a brutal assault on a group of tourists, killing at least 26 people and injuring more than 20 others.

The incident has cast a sharp spotlight on longstanding regional instability, echoed in a recently declassified 1993 CIA assessment warning, accessed by Firstpost, that South Asia’s fragile balance could quickly escalate to nuclear levels during crises.

According to eyewitnesses, the assailants — armed and dressed in traditional attire — reportedly segregated the victims based on their ability to recite Islamic verses before executing them at close range.

The attackers demanded that the tourists recite the kalma (Islamic declaration of faith), targeting those who could not comply.

The victims included tourists from various Indian states and one individual from Nepal. This is among the deadliest attacks on civilians in the subcontinent since the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

A declassified CIA insight

The severity of the Pahalgam attack has rekindled concerns over the fragile security environment in the broader region.

Firstpost found that much of the context to these tensions is found in a recently declassified 1993 CIA report titled ‘India-Pakistan: Prospects for War in the 1990s’, which examines the enduring strategic anxieties on the subcontinent, particularly Pakistan’s fear of a superior India.

The report adjudicates that “India has no strategic interest in initiating a war with Pakistan,” pointing out the fact that “Pakistan has lost previous engagements, and its leaders probably believe another war could destroy the military or even the state.”

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“Another conflict with India could well destroy the Pakistan military”

In one of its key assumptions, Firstpost saw that the report acknowledges that the “governments in New Delhi and Islamabad [following phrase redacted]. They generally will remain centrist, democratic, and secular in orientation, but the Pakistani Army will continue to play a role beyond its constitutional mandate.”

The report also added that, “India’s military and economic advantages over Pakistan will increase over time.”

The report offers critical insight into how Pakistan has historically viewed its nuclear arsenal. It notes: “Pakistan sees nuclear weapons primarily as a deterrent and as insurance for its survival if a conflict developed with conventionally superior India.”

This deterrent posture stems from Pakistan’s perception of military inferiority, shaped by past defeats and the fear that another conventional war could imperil the state’s very existence.

The report also looks at the possibility of another coup in Pakistan, stating, “Another Army seizure of power in Pakistan would immediately set back relations with India. After an initial period of mistrust, however, New Delhi would accustom itself to dealing with a military regime that, in our estimation, would want to avoid war. As in the past, a military government probably would be cautious but willing to negotiate with India.”

Deterrence - Nuclear & Economic

The document explores the volatility of nuclear deterrence in South Asia. It warns: “Either military could develop hair-trigger responses that would escalate quickly to the nuclear level.”

This warning highlights the possibility of miscalculation or rapid escalation, where even a limited skirmish could spiral into a catastrophic exchange.

The report further raises concerns about the potential “breakdown of nuclear deterrence,” should either side misread intentions or act preemptively.

The CIA assessment also highlights economic considerations as a critical factor restraining both nations from full-scale war. It points out: “Both sides believe the economic costs of another war would be exorbitant,” particularly due to the risk of losing access to public and private foreign capital.

Highlighting at a potential economic crisis in Pakistan, the report also stated,“Pakistan’s economic woes make it questionable whether its military budget can be sustained at the level needed to keep it militarily competitive with India, which is much bigger and richer, and economically more robust. "

Moreover, the report recognises that both India and Pakistan have historically shown an ability to manage crises without letting them spiral, providing a degree of cautious optimism regarding their crisis management capabilities.

About Kashmir: A flashpoint

Kashmir continues to be the most contentious issue between the two nations. The report cautions that flashpoints like Kashmir, “internal meddling,” and “communal incidents” could lead to war through miscalculations or intelligence failures.

It further notes: “Possession of Muslim-majority Kashmir is fundamental to the self-image of each nation, it has been a battlefield in all previous conflicts. About 350,000 Indian troops are fighting an insurgency that appears to have no end. These forces can prevent Kashmir’s succession or its acquisition by Pakistan, but are unlikely to defeat the insurgents.”

The report also highlights the fact that Pakistan has been incapable of handling the conflict with India on its own, stating,” Pakistan sees Kashmir as an issue of self-determination and human rights. It backs 40-year-old UN resolutions calling for a plebiscite that allows Kashmiris to choose between India and Pakistan. Islamabad will seek every opportunity to internationalise the dispute, including pleas to Washington to convene a Camp David-like process."

Although the report, at the time, also says that there is a 20 per cent chance of war between India and Pakistan. This was an estimate for the 1990s.

Indira Gandhi’s nuclear strike consideration

Adding depth to the historical context, a separate declassified CIA document from 1981 —titled India’s Reaction to Nuclear Developments in Pakistan — had previously revealed that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had considered launching a strike on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities.

This occurred when the US was preparing to supply F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan.

The CIA report observed: “In the extreme case, if Indian concerns increase over the next two or three months, we believe the conditions could be ripe for a decision by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to instigate a military confrontation with Pakistan, primarily to provide a framework for destroying Pakistan’s nuclear facilities.”

This revelation illustrates the historical depth of India’s concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions and the seriousness with which the US has viewed the emerging threat.

How conditions can deteriorate so quickly

In response, the Indian government initiated several significant actions. These included suspending participation in the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, shutting the main land border with Pakistan, and reducing the diplomatic presence in Islamabad.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi strongly condemned the attack and vowed justice for the victims. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh declared that India would act against not only the perpetrators but also their supporters.

Meanwhile, Islamabad denied any involvement, expressed condolences (while falling short of a condemnation), and criticised India’s move to suspend the water treaty, labelling it as “water warfare.”

Pakistan, in response, has also shut its airspace for Indian airlines among other reactions.

The international community — including leaders from the United States and the United Kingdom — also condemned the attack and expressed solidarity with India.

The situation is still developing. The responses to the Pahalgam attack demonstrate just how quickly conditions can deteriorate.

About the CIA report in question

On its first page, the report is introduced with the following phrase, “This National Intelligence Estimate represents the views of the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice and assistance of the US Intelligence Community.”

For context:

From 1946 to 2004, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) served as the head of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The DCI was the chief intelligence advisor to the President and the National Security Council and was responsible for coordinating intelligence efforts across the various US intelligence agencies, collectively referred to as the Intelligence Community beginning in 1981.

The position existed from January 1946 until December 17, 2004.

Following the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act in the US, the role was restructured — leadership of the Intelligence Community was transferred to the newly established Director of National Intelligence (DNI), while the Director of the CIA (D/CIA) became solely responsible for overseeing the CIA.

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